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Davis v. Israel: When Miranda Warnings
Do Not Warn
In Miranda v. Arizona,' the United States Supreme Court
prohibited the prosecution from introducing at trial statements
made by an accused during a custodial2 interrogation, unless
the prosecution demonstrated that, in obtaining such state-
ments,4 procedural safeguards deemed necessary to protect the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination had been
employed.5 In Davis v. Israel,' a federal district court held for
the first time that the usual Miranda warnings,7 although prop-
erly given, do not protect a defendant's Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination if the warnings do not inform him that
his right to remain silent includes the right to refuse to comply
with a police request to produce incriminating evidence. 8
The defendant in Davis was charged with murder. The
morning after the crime had ,been committed, police officers
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Custodial situations include those in which an individual is "deprived of his free-
dom by the authorities in any significant way . Id. at 478. See note 19 and accom-
panying text infra.
3. Recently, the Supreme Court has stated that "the definition of interrogation can
extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have
known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Rhode Island v. Innis,
48 U.S.L.W. 4506, 4509 (1980) (emphasis in original). See notes 23-26 and accompanying
text infra.
4. Specifically, the person must be warned that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
consult with an attorney, and to have an attorney present during interrogation and that,
if he desires but cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have held that this prohibition against the use
of statements made without the benefit of the Miranda warnings extends only to the
prosecution's use of such statements in the case-in-chief and does not limit their use for
impeachment purposes. See notes 48-52 and accompanying text infra.
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). See notes 18-45 and accompanying
text infra.
6. 453 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis. 1978), afl'd, 601 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1979). Except as
otherwise noted, the facts of Davis are drawn from the district court opinion.
7. See note 4 supra.
8. 453 F. Supp. at 1326.
1
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:183
went to Davis's apartment to arrest him. After informing him
that he was under arrest and advising him of his Miranda rights,
the arresting officer, according to his own testimony, told Davis,
who was not dressed at the time, to put on the clothes he had
worn the previous night. Davis received no warning that he need
not comply with this order. The trousers that he put on were
bloodstained, and the blood type matched that of the victim but
not that of the defendant. The manner in which these pants
were obtained formed the basis of the defendant's post-convic-
tion claim9 that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation had been violated.10
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, in granting Davis a writ of habeas corpus, held that
Davis's production of the clothing at the request of the police"
9. At a pretrial hearing, the defendant's motion to suppress the pants as evidence at
trial was denied. The district court opinion indicates that Davis sought suppression on
three theories: the seizure of the pants required a search warrant under the Fourth
Amendment; since the prosecution could not show that the pants had been worn on the
night of the murder, introduction of the pants into evidence would be both immaterial to
the trial and prejudicial to the defendant; and, the manner in which the defendant's
identification of the pants was obtained violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1318, 1323.
10. Davis was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
After his conviction, Davis appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, asserting that the
evidence should have been suppressed on either Fourth or Fifth Amendment grounds.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. State v. Davis, 66 Wis. 2d 636,
225 N.W.2d 505 (1975). It did not, however, deal with the Fifth Amendment claim; in-
stead, it considered only the Fourth Amendment grounds raised in his suppression mo-
tion. Id. at 657, 225 N.W.2d at 515.
Davis then petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976), claiming that admission of his pants into evidence constituted
a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
11. Davis's claim was based on the arresting officer's testimony that he had ordered
Davis to put on the clothing that Davis had worn the previous evening. Brief for Peti-
tioner at 5, Davis v. Israel, 453 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis. 1978). Davis, however, had
testified both at the pre-trial suppression hearing and at trial that the police officer did
not so direct him. Brief for Respondent at 5-6, Davis v. Israel, 453 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D.
Wis. 1978). The state contended that, since the state courts had failed to resolve the
conflicting testimony, an evidentiary hearing should be held to resolve the factual dis-
pute over the manner in which the clothing was obtained. Id. at 6-7.
The district court did not find it necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing. 453 F.
Supp. at 1323. Instead, it determined that the trial court, in its denial of Davis's motion
to suppress, had implicitly found that the testimony of the officers was to be believed
and that Davis had heard and complied with an order to put on the clothing he had been
wearing on the previous evening. Id. The district court also found that Davis had not
been warned specifically that he need not comply with such an order. In accordance with
these findings, the district court granted the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the
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constituted a self-incriminating statement and that, although
Davis had been given the standard Miranda warnings,12 such
warnings did not adequately apprise him of his right to refuse to
produce the clothing. The court reasoned that since, under the
circumstances of the case, the right to remain silent included the
right not to put on the clothing, Davis's waiver of the right to
remain silent was unknowing and, therefore, involuntary. 18
Thus, the prosecution's introduction of the pants into evidence
at trial violated Davis's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. 14
Part I of this note explores both the scope and operation of
Miranda's protection of a defendant's Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and the distinctions between produc-
tion of testimonial evidence, which is protected by the Fifth
Amendment, and production of nontestimonial evidence, which
is not so protected. Part II details the Davis decision. Part III
first examines the basis of the court's holding that the defen-
dant's production of his clothing was a testimonial response pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment and concludes that the court's
determination was correct. Part III considers the court's holding
that, notwithstanding that the defendant was properly advised
basis of the Fifth Amendment violation. Id. at 1327. The district court reasoned that, if
the trial court had found otherwise, it would have prohibited the state from introducing
the pants as evidence at trial, since the materiality of this evidence depended on Davis's
identifying them as the pants worn on the night of the murder. In addition, the district
court reasoned that the trial court had based its decision denying the motion to suppress
on the ground that Davis had made no oral or written testimonial communication in
reference to the pants and that therefore, no Fifth Amendment violation had occurred.
Id. at 1323.
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See note 4 supra.
13. 453 F. Supp. at 1326.
14. The court also determined that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 1327. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). According to the
Davis opinion, the clothing was the only piece of physical evidence which in any way
implicated the defendant in the murder. Without the pants, the conviction would have
rested on the confused testimony of the victim's eight-year-old child and a chain of cir-
cumstantial evidence which did not implicate the defendant directly in the murder. 453
F. Supp. at 1327.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this decision in
an unpublished opinion. Davis v. Israel, No. 78-2143 (7th Cir. Mar. 23, 1979). The only
issue on appeal was whether the district court was required to hold an evidentiary hear-
ing to determine the circumstances surrounding Davis's arrest. Id. at 5. The court of
appeals held that such a hearing was not necessary and agreed with the district court's
ruling that Davis's nonverbal identification of the pants was testimonial. Id. at 7.
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of his Miranda rights before being ordered to put on the cloth-
ing, his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
was violated. This note agrees that, in the circumstances of this
case, the standard Miranda warnings were insufficient to inform
the defendant of the potential waiver of his Fifth Amendment
rights. Part IV concludes that Davis is consistent with the Mi-
randa requirements of adequate warning and effective waiver
and that the Davis court correctly held that the Fifth Amend-
ment was violated.
I. Background
A. Scope and Function of Miranda
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . . ."15 A defendant in a criminal case, therefore, may
refuse to testify at trial," and the prosecution may not comment
on his failure to take the stand.17
In Miranda v. Arizona,"8 the Supreme Court extended the
protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination to statements made by an accused during custodial in-
terrogation, 19 directing that before the prosecution may use any
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision was made applicable to the states in Mal-
loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
16. The privilege against self-incrimination originated .from a belief that it was in-
appropriate to use legal process to extract from a person's own lips an admission of guilt
which would take the place of other evidence. 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2263 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961).
17. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). Further, if the government com-
pels a witness to testify in a grand jury proceeding, he must be granted immunity from
the use of this testimony against him. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453
(1972).
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19. "[Tjhere can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available
outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in
which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to
incriminate themselves." Id. at 467.
The question of what constitutes a curtailment of freedom continues to be litigated.
In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), the Supreme Court held that when the defen-
dant was questioned by four police officers in his bedroom, he was "in custody" and the
Miranda requirements applied. The police officers had testified that the defendant was
under arrest and was not free to leave.
In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant was not in custody at the time he made his initial confession. The police had
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/6
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such statements, it must demonstrate that procedural safe-
guards effective to secure the privilege had been employed. 20
The safeguards combat the inherent pressures of interrogation
which might compel a person to speak who otherwise might not
do so freely.21 The warnings are intended to inform the detained
individual of his privilege so that he can exercise it, or waive it,
intelligently, and to notify him that, if he chooses to exercise
this privilege,2 his interrogators will cease their questioning.
Recently, in Rhode Island v. Innis," the Supreme Court for
the first time addressed the issue of the meaning of "interroga-
tion" under Miranda. The police arrested the defendant on the
street after a taxi-cab driver had identified the defendant's pho-
tograph as that of the man who had just robbed the driver after
threatening him with a sawed-off shotgun. The defendant was
unarmed at the time of his arrest. The police advised him of his
Miranda rights, and the defendant responded that he under-
stood his rights and wanted to speak with a lawyer. He was then
placed in a police car to be driven to the police station. The po-
lice officers assigned to accompany him were instructed not to
question, intimidate, or coerce him in any way.
While en route to the police station, two of the officers
conversed about the missing shotgun. One officer expressed con-
cern that a handicapped child, from a nearby school for the
attempted to find Mathiason in order to question him about a burglary. After trying
unsuccessfully to reach him, the police officer left a card at Mathiason's apartment ask-
ing him to call. Mathiason, who was on parole, called the officer and agreed to meet him
at the State Parole Office. Upon his arrival, Mathiason was taken to ar office, advised
that the police believed he was involved in the burglary, and falsely told that his finger-
prints had been found at the scene. He was also told that his truthfulness might be
considered by the district attorney and the judge. Mathiason confessed to the crime. The
officer then advised him of his rights under Miranda and took a taped confession. In
deciding that Mathiason was not in custody at the time of his confession, the Court
stressed that Mathiason voluntarily went to the police station, was told that he was not
under arrest, and left the police station after confession. Id. at 495.
See generally Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Consti-
tutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. REv. 699, 707-10 (1974); Stone, The Miranda
Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REv. 99, 147-54 [hereinafter cited as The
Miranda Doctrine].
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). See note 4 supra.
21. 384 U.S. at 467.
22. Id. at 468.
23. 100 S.Ct. 1682 (1980). Prior decisions had focused on the "custodial" element of
"custodial interrogation." See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
19801
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handicapped, might find the gun and injure himself. The defen-
-dant interrupted the conversation at this point and asked the
officers to turn the car around so that he coiild show them where
the gun was located. The police car returned to the scene, and
the defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights. He re-
plied that he understood his rights but that he "wanted to get
the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area in the
school." He then led the police to a nearby field and pointed out
the location of the shotgun.
Before his trial on charges of the kidnapping, robbery and
murder of another taxi-cab driver, the defendant moved to sup-
press both the shotgun and the statements regarding it that he
had made to the police. The trial court denied this motion, and
the defendant was subsequently convicted on all counts. The
Rhode Island Supreme Court set aside the conviction, holding
that the defendant was entitled to a new trial since, contrary to
Miranda, the police officers had interrogated him without ob-
taining a valid waiver of his right to counsel.2 '
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, holding that the defendant
had not been interrogated in violation of Miranda and setting
out a test for determining whether interrogation has occurred.
According to the Court, interrogation includes not only express
questioning, but also any words or actions on the part of the
police, other than those normally attendant to arrest and cus-
tody, that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect.25 The Court stated
that the latter portion of this definition focuses primarily on the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than on the intent of the po-
lice, since Miranda was designed to provide protection to an ac-
cused without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent
of the police.
Several courts have considered whether particular warnings,
as given, were adequate to inform defendants of their rights, ei-
ther because the warnings were incomplete or because the lan-
guage used departed in some way from that set out in Mi-
24. State v. Innis, -- R.I.-, 391 A.2d 1158 (1978).
25. 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91.
26. Id.
[Vol. 1:183
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randa2  In Coyote v. United States,28 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit set out a test for determining
the adequacy of any particular warning: "The crucial test is
whether the words in the context used, considering the age,
background and intelligence of the individual being interro-
gated, impart a clear, understandable warning of all of his
rights. '29 Other courts have adopted this test.30
After a defendant has been advised of his rights, he may
choose to waive them and agree to make a statement or answer
questions. Such statements or answers, however, are admissible
at trial only if the waiver was made intelligently and know-
ingly.3 1 Thus, the Miranda Court applied the standard generally
used for the waiver of consitutional rights, 2 that standard set
out by the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst.33 Therein, the Court had
described a waiver as the "intentional relinquishment . . . of a
known right or privilege" and had determined that any question
of whether there has been an intelligent waiver must be deter-
mined on the particular facts of each case, including the back-
27. E.g., South Dakota v. Long, 465 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1130 (1973) (statement inadmissible since the defendant was not advised of his rights to
appointed counsel and to stop talking any time he wished); United States v. Lamia, 429
F.2d 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 907 (1970) (statement admissible although the
defendant was not told that he had the "right to remain silent," but rather that he "need
not make any statement. . . at this time"). These decisions stressed that, in determining
the adequacy of Miranda warnings, priority must be given to substance, not form.
28. 380 F.2d 305 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992 (1967). The defendant had
argued that his written statement of his understanding of his right-"I can talk to a
lawyer or anyone before saying anything, and. . . the judge will get me a lawyer if I am
broke"-reflected that he was not clearly informed of his right to appointed counsel at
the time of questioning. Id. at 307. The court found the warnings to be adequate. Id. at
308.
29. Id. at 308.
30. See, e.g., Sotelo v. State, 264 Ind. 298, 342 N.E.2d 844 (1976); State v. Maluia,
56 Haw. 428, 539 P.2d 1200 (1975).
31. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
32. The Miranda opinion stated: "This Court has always set high standards of proof
for the waiver of constitutional rights. . . and we re-assert these standards as applied to
in-custody interrogation." Id. at 475. For a discussion of the constitutional basis of the
Miranda holding, see Schrock, Welsh, & Collins, Interrogational Rights: Reflections on
Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Interrogational
Rights].
33. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The decision dealt with the waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to have counsel present at trial.
1980]
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ground, experience and conduct of the accused."'
Neither Miranda, nor any of the Supreme Court decisions
construing Miranda, has precisely defined the degree of knowl-
edge necessary to satisfy the "knowing and intelligent" standard
in the context of the waiver of the Fifth Amendment right. It
appears that the requisite knowledge does not require that the
individual understand his personal jeopardy. Thus, in United
States v. Washington,85 the Supreme Court indicated that an
individual's lack of knowledge that, at the time of questioning,
the police considered him to be a suspect, and not just a witness,
would not have affected the validity of his waiver.3 6 Lower
courts have held that a defendant's ignorance of the nature of
the crime charged, 7 or the degree of punishment permitted,8
does not preclude a finding of knowing waiver. Rather, what is
required is merely that the defendant understand that he has
the right to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, to have
an attorney present during interrogation, and to have an attor-
ney appointed for him if he cannot afford to retain one and that,
if he waives these rights, anything he says can be used against
him at trial.39
Miranda requires that the defendant indicate that he
wishes to waive any or all of his rights.'0 The Miranda Court
stated that, if an interrogation continues without the presence of
an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on
the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to retained or appointed counsel.4 ' The decision
thus strongly suggests that, in order to introduce at trial a de-
fendant's statements made during pre-trial detention, the gov-
34. Id. at 464.
35. 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
36. Id. at 188.
37. E.g., Harris v. Riddle, 551 F.2d 936 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 849 (1977)
(defendant unaware of felony murder doctrine and rules of evidence); United States v.
Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (defendant not told the nature of the charge
for which he was arrested). See note 164 infra.
38. United States v. Hall, 396 F.2d 841 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918 (1968).
See note 165 infra.
39. See notes 164-65 and accompanying text infra.
40. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text infra.
41. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
[Vol. 1:183
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ernment must show an explicit waiver by the defendant of his
rights. In a more recent decision, North Carolina v. Butler,42
however, which clarified this issue, the Supreme Court held that
an express statement of waiver by the defendant is not invaria-
bly necessary to support a finding that he waived his Fifth
Amendment right. The decision reversed a North Carolina Su-
preme Court decision' s reversing the defendant's conviction and
ordering a new trial. The North Carolina Supreme Court had
found that the pre-trial statements of the defendant, who had
neither signed a written waiver of the right to counsel nor made
a specific oral waiver, were inadmissible under Miranda." In re-
jecting the North Carolina determination, the Supreme Court
indicated that a waiver can be inferred from the actions and
words of the person interrogated; the question is not whether
the alleged waiver was of a particular form, but, rather, whether
the defendant knowingly and voluntarily relinquished his Mi-
randa rights."
The Supreme Court, in decisions following Miranda, has
limited Miranda's protections in various ways.4" The decisions
have viewed the Miranda requirements as a means of deterring
unlawful police conduct, rather than as a means of informing the
defendant of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. 17
42. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
43. State v. Butler, 295 N.C. 250, 244 S.E.2d 410 (1978).
44. Id.
45. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). Justice Blackmun concurred
on the assumption that the Court's citation to Johnson v. Zerbst did not suggest that the
Zerbst formula for determining a waiver of fundamental constitutional rights had any
relevance in determining whether a defendant had waived his right to a lawyer under
Miranda's prophylactic rule. 441 U.S. at 376 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See notes 53-56
and accompanying text infra.
46. One commentator notes that the Burger Court's constriction of Miranda is evi-
denced not only in its substantive decisions, but also in the manner in which the Court
has exercised its power to decide which cases to review. The Miranda Doctrine, supra
note 19, at 100. His data reveal that during the 1973-1976 Terms, the Court granted
certiorari in only one of the thirty-five cases in which a defendant sought review of a
lower court decision holding evidence admissible over a claimed Miranda violation. Dur-
ing the same period, the Court granted certiorari in thirteen of the twenty-five cases in
which the government sought review of a lower court decision excluding evidence on the
authority of Miranda. Id.
47. See Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual, and the Criminal Process: Direc-
tions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U.L. Rgv. 518, 531 (1977); Interrogational Rights, supra
note 28.
1980]
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In Harris v. New York, 48 the Court held that pre-trial state-
ments obtained from a defendant who had not been informed of
his right to appointed counsel could be used to impeach his tes-
timony.' According to the Court, the necessity of affording the
jury a means by which to test the defendant's credibility out-
weighed any possible deterrent effect that total exclusion of the
statements might have had on future police conduct. This deter-
rent effect was adequately assured, the Court noted, by exclud-
ing the evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief.50 Four
years later, in Oregon v. Hass,51 the Court permitted the prose-
cution to impeach a defendant's testimony through the use of
statements which the defendant had made in response to police
questioning and without the presence of an attorney after he
had been fully advised of his rights and had requested that an
attorney be present."
In Michigan v. Tucker," the Court permitted the prosecu-
tion to present at trial a witness whose existence had been dis-
covered only through statements made by the defendant while
he was in police custody, but had not been apprised of his right
to appointed counsel." The Court began its analysis of Tucker's
Fifth Amendment claim by noting a distinction between police
conduct which infringes the right against self-incrimination and
that which violates only Miranda's prophylactic rules. The
48. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
49. The Miranda opinion had indicated that any use of a defendant's statements,
including use for impeachment purposes, was impermissible without full warnings to,
and an effective waiver by, the defendant. 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966). The Harris Court
dismissed this language as dictum. 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
50. 401 U.S. at 225.
51. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
52. Id. at 723-24.
53. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
54. Id. at 436.
55. Id. at 439. Justice Douglas did not agree with this distinction:
The Court is not free to prescribe preferred modes of interrogation absent a con-
stitutional basis. We held the "requirement of warnings and waiver of rights [to
be] fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege," 384 U.S. at 476,
and without so holding we would have been powerless to reverse Miranda's convic-
tion. While Miranda recognized that police need not mouth the precise words con-
tained in the Court's opinion, such warnings were held necessary "unless other
fully effective means are adopted to notify the person" of his rights.
Id. at 462-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479
.(1966)).
[Vol. 1:183
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/6
DAVIS V. ISRAEL
Court stated that Miranda itself had recognized that the proce-
dural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution." Thus, the Court found that although one of the
required warnings had not been administered to Tucker, his
statements were not involuntary 7 and therefore had not been
taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 8 The Court empha-
sized that use of Tucker's statements by the prosecution to iden-
tify a potential witness could not encourage police misconduct
since the police had acted in good faith and the interrogation
had occurred prior to the Miranda decision.'9
Harris, Hass, and Tucker evidence the Court's narrowing
both of the purpose of the Miranda warnings and of the exclu-
sionary effect of failure to observe the Miranda requirements.
Still, however, these violations of Miranda barred the prosecu-
tions' uses of the defendants' statements in their cases-in-chief;
the Court weighed the deterrent effect of excluding the state-
ments only in connection with a collateral use of the statements.
Thus, Miranda's prohibition of the use by the prosecution in its
case-in-chief of statements taken from a defendant without
proper warnings and waiver has not been altered.60
B. Testimonial and Physical Evidence
Testimonial evidence which is protected by the Fifth
Amendment generally includes all forms of communications by
the accused. 1 In contrast, evidence of a nontestimonial nature,
56. Id. at 444. Justice Rehnquist was referring to the following language in Miranda:
"[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular
solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently con-
ducted." 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). The Miranda Court added, however, "[U]nless we are
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of
their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the follow-
ing safeguards must be observed." Id.
57. In Miranda, however, the Court had noted that the statements of the Miranda
defendants might not have been found involuntary in traditional terms. Nonetheless, the
statements were suppressed. 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
58. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-45 (1974).
59. Id. at 447.
60. For a review of the Burger Court decisions interpreting Miranda, see The Mi-
randa Doctrine, supra note 19.
61. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966). A nod or a headshake may
be a testimonial communication. Id. at 761 n. 5. For a discussion of the treatment, by the
military courts, of non-verbal conduct, see Reilly, Non-verbal Statements: Observations
1980]
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however incriminating, is generally not protected by the Fifth
Amendment. In Holt v. United States,62 the Supreme Court
held that compelling a defendant to try on a certain shirt to de-
termine whether it fit him did not violate the Fifth Amendment.
In the words of Justice Holmes, "[T]he prohibition of compel-
ling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evi-
dence when it may be material."" In Schmerber v. California,4
the Supreme Court held that a physician's drawing of blood
from the defendant over his objection, and the subjection of the
sample to blood analysis, was not testimonial compulsion, and,
therefore, admission of the evidence was not barred as violative
of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right." The Court rea-
soned that, although the evidence was incriminating and had
been forcibly compelled, it was not the result of any communica-
tion or writing by the defendant, who participated merely as a
donor.6
Later decisions, employing the Schmerber analysis, have
held that the Fifth Amendment does not protect an accused
from being forced to appear in a line-up, 7 or to furnish voice
exemplars,6 8 handwriting exemplars," or fingernail scrapings.70
Although compulsion may be present in these cases, the accused
is merely compelled to exhibit his physical characteristics; he is
not compelled to disclose any knowledge he may have.7 1 Mi-
randa warnings need not be administered to a defendant from
On a Unique Concept Employed by Military Courts, 25 JAG J. 24 (1970-71).
62. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
63. Id. at 252-53.
64. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
65. Id. at 772.
66. Id. at 765.
67. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Absent an intelligent waiver, the
Sixth Amendment requires the presence of counsel at post-indictment line-ups. Id. at
237.
68. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
69. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
70. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
71. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967). But see Dann, The Fifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence From A
Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 597 (1970) (illustrating some of the difficulties inherent in
the testimonial/physical distinction).
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whom such physical evidence is sought.72
Recently, however, some state courts have, in certain cir-
cumstances, construed a defendant's production of physical evi-
dence as testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment,73 thus making the .Miranda requirements applicable and
mandating suppression of the evidence if the warnings have not
been given.7 ' In each of these cases, the police had no constitu-
tional basis for seizing the evidence; the defendant produced it
in response to police questioning.
Certain physical evidence can also be constitutionally ob-
tained by means of a search warrant,75 or through one of the
exceptions the Supreme Court has made to the warrant require-
ment.7 6 A seizure of items obtained during a search incident to a
lawful arrest is permitted," regardless of whether the items
seized are contraband, instrumentalities, or mere evidences.7  An
individual's consent to a search will also vitiate the need for a
search warrant, and, generally, the individual need not be told
that he has the right to refuse consent.79
Cases involving the production of documents have been
given separate treatment by the Supreme Court.80 In an early
decision,81 the Court indicated that, because of the contents of
private papers, their compelled production warranted the Fifth
Amendment protection afforded to testimonial communica-
tions.8 2 More recent decisions discussed below, however, have
72. E.g., People v. Mouton, 94 Cal. App. 3d 994, 156 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1979) (trying on
clothing); State v. Boley, 565 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. App. 1978) (handwriting exemplar).
73. State v. Mason, 164 N.J. Super. 1, 395 A.2d 536 (1979); State v. Dennis, 16
Wash. App. 417, 558 P.2d 297 (1976); State v. Moreno, 21 Wash. App. 430, 585 P.2d 481
(1978).
74. See notes 132-35 and accompanying text infra.
75. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
76. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless search for contraband in a
vehicle upheld because based on probable cause).
77. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
78. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309-10 (1967).
79. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (non-custodial search).
80. For a general discussion of the protection of private papers, see Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
81. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
82. "[A] compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner of
goods sought to be forfeited . . . is compelling him to be a witness against himself,
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution .. " Id. at 634-35.
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emphasized the nature of the compulsion rather than the con-
tents of the documents 3 and have concluded that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is only violated when the defendant is
compelled to "authenticate" the documents.
In Bettis v. United States, 4 the Court refused to extend a
partner's personal Fifth Amendment privilege to the partnership
records of a small law firm.85 The Court described the privilege
as designed to "prevent the use of legal process. . . to force [the
accused] to produce and authenticate any personal documents
or effects that might incriminate him."86 In Fisher v. United
States,87 the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment did
not preclude the Internal Revenue Service from requiring the
taxpayer to produce documents prepared by the taxpayer's ac-
countants.8 The Court reasoned that, since the existence and
location of the papers were already known, the taxpayer's im-
plicit admission of their existence was not constitutionally pro-
tected." Further, his response to the subpoena would not au-
thenticate the contents of the papers, since he had not prepared
them and could not vouch for their accuracy.90 In a footnote, the
Court cited the "implicit authentication" rationale as the pre-
vailing justification for the Fifth Amendment's application to
documentary subpoenas.91 The Fisher case was relied on in An-
dresen v. Maryland," in which the Court held that the search,
pursuant to a search warrant, of an individual's office for busi-
83. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391 (1976); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
According to Justice Marshall, "This technical and somewhat esoteric focus on the
testimonial elements of production rather than on the contents of the evidence the inves-
tigator seeks is. . .contrary to the history and traditions of the privilege. ... Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 431 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring).
84. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
85. Id. at 101.
86. Id. at 88 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944)).
87. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
88. Id. at 411-14.
89. Id. at 411.
90. Id. at 413.
91. Id. at 412 n. 12. A witness implicitly authenticates a document when his very act
of producing it provides his assurance that the article produced is the one demanded.
The taxpayer in Fisher could not implicitly authenticate the documents that he was
required to produce since he had not prepared them. Id. at 413.
92. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
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ness records, the seizure of those records, and the subsequent
introduction of those records into evidence, did not violate the
Fifth Amendment."8 The Court again noted that the individual
was neither asked to do or say anything nor to authenticate the
records." These cases indicate that, in the context of the com-
pelled production of documents, the application of the Fifth
Amendment privilege does not depend on whether the docu-
ments themselves are incriminating, but, rather, on whether the
accused himself has been required to authenticate them either
explicitly or implicitly.
II. The District Court's Decision in Davis v. Israel
The District Court began its analysis of the Fifth Amend-
ment issue in Davis by determining that the pants had been ad-
mitted into evidence by the trial court judge on the implicit
finding that they were indeed the pants that Davis. had worn at
the time of the murder.' 5 It further determined that Davis was
in police custody at the time he produced the clothing he had
worn the night before," and that he had been given the Mi-
randa warnings before being told to put on the clothes."' Thus,
the issue presented by these facts, according to the court, was
whether Davis
was required to give evidence against himself in violation of his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when, fol-
lowing his arrest, he was ordered to put on the clothing which he
had worn at the time of the murder, without having been warned
specifically that he need not comply with such an order."
93. Id. at 472-73.
94. Id. at 473-74. For analysis of the Burger Court's application of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege to cases involving private papers, see Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates
the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REv. 383 (1977); Ber-
ger, The Unprivileged Status of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
191 (1978).
95. Davis v. Israel, 453 F. Supp. 1316, 1323 (E.D. Wis. 1978). See note 11 and ac-
companying text supra.
96. 453 F. Supp. at 1323. The officers testified that they had gone to the defendant's
apartment to arrest him and that at least one officer had drawn his gun. See note 19
supra.
97. 453 F. Supp. at 1323-24.
98. Id. at 1324.
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The Davis court first considered whether Davis's action in
putting on the clothing was testimonial and, thus, protected by
the Fifth Amendment. It found that the trial court had been
incorrect in equating Davis's actions in response to the police
order with the actions of a suspect who submits to fingerprinting
or other physical tests and, therefore, that the trial court's reli-
ance on Schmerber v. California" was misplaced. 00 According
to Davis, although clothing per se is physical evidence and non-
testimonial, 10 1 Davis's act in putting on certain clothing, and
thereby identifying it for the police, was testimonial. 02 In sup-
port of this conclusion, the Davis opinion quoted from a Califor-
nia Supreme Court opinion, People v. Ellis, '0 in which Chief
Justice Traynor explained the distinction between acts which
are testimonial and those which are not. 04 It also discussed
three United States Supreme Court cases involving the produc-
tion of documents: Bellis v. United States,05 Fisher v. United
States, s06 and Andresen v. Maryland.0 7 In these cases, accord-
ing to the Davis court, the Supreme Court had recognized that
the protections of the Fifth Amendment are not limited to oral
communications but also include privileges against performing
acts which are substitutes for words. 10 8
99. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
100. 453 F. Supp. at 1324.
101. Id. (citing United States v. King, 433 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 976 (1971); McClard v. United States, 386 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 866 (1968)).
102. 453 F. Supp. at 1324.
103. 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
104. 453 F. Supp. at 1324. The court quoted the following language from Ellis:
In such a test [voice identification], the speaker is asked, not to communicate
ideas or knowledge of facts, but to engage in the physiological processes necessary
to produce a series of articulated sounds, the verbal meanings of which are
unimportant ...
Voice identification testimony is the product of an observable physical char-
acteristic made by an independent witness. It is the very type of objective factual
evidence, independent of information communicated by the accused, that the
privilege encourages police to seek. Moreover, independent identification testi-
mony, unlike testimonial evidence derived from the accused, raises no question of
reliance on the veracity of the accused.
People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d at 531, 421 P.2d at 395, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
105. 417 U.S. 85 (1974). See notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra.
106. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). See notes 87-91 and accompanying text supra.
107. 427 U.S. 463 (1976). See notes 92-94 and accompanying text supra.
108. 453 F. Supp. at 1324.
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The court then stated that while the police could have
seized Davis's clothing during a search incident to a lawful ar-
rest, such seizure would not have provided them with evidence
that these clothes were, in fact, those worn by Davis the previ-
ous night, the night when the murder was committed.109 This
information could only have been provided by Davis himself or
by some other person who had seen him at that time; the prose-
cution, however, presented no such witness at trial.110
In concluding its analysis of whether Davis's acts were testi-
monial, the court found no difference between a suspect's state-
ment that he wore certain clothes at a certain time and his ad-
mission, by putting them on in response to a direct order to do
so, of the fact that he had worn the clothing."1 In this context,
the court referred to Null v. Wainwright,"2 in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a defen-
dant's statement, in response to a police officer's request for cer-
tain clothes, that the clothes were the ones he had worn at a
specified time, should be suppressed at trial because, at the time
the statement was made, the defendant had been in custody and
had not been given the proper Miranda warnings.118
The court next addressed the question of whether the Mi-
randa warnings which Davis had been given were sufficient to
apprise him of his right not to provide the police with the
clothes that he had been wearing on the previous night." 4 The
court reasoned that no person would infer, from a police warning
that he had the right to remain silent, the further right to defy a
direct police order by refusing to produce the physical evidence
sought by the police." 5 To support the proposition that "[a] lay-
man may not be aware of the precise scope, the nuances, and
boundaries of his Fifth Amendment privilege,"' 6 the court
quoted the Supreme Court decision in Maness v. Meyers,"'
109. Id. at 1325.
110. Id. at 1325-26.
111. Id. at 1326.
112. 508 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 970 (1975).
113. Id. at 345.
114. 453 F. Supp. at 1326.
115. Id.
116. 453 F. Supp. at 1326 (quoting Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975)).
117. 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
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which upheld, as non-contumacious conduct, the acts of an at-
torney in advising his client not to produce material which the
lawyer believed would incriminate the client. Accordingly, the
court held that the mandate of the Fifth Amendment had been
violated, not because the Miranda warnings as given deviated
from the language required by that opinion, but, rather, because,
under the circumstances of this case, the defendant's waiver of
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was un-
knowing and, therefore, involuntary. 18
III. Analysis
The facts of Davis raise issues involving two separate lines
of decisions: those determining what constitutes testimonial
communication and those determining the scope and function of
the Miranda warnings. The Davis holding appears to be con-
trary to both of these lines of decision. First, an order to put on
clothing does not usually involve any Fifth Amendment rights.119
In Davis, however, the defendant's acquiescence was held to be
testimonial evidence within the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Second, when an intelligent person makes an incriminat-
ing statement after receiving Miranda warnings in the manner
prescribed by the Supreme Court, use of those statements at
trial generally violates no constitutional right.1 20 In Davis, how-
ever, the court found a violation of the Fifth Amendment. De-
spite these apparent contradictions, close analysis reveals that
Davis is, in fact, consistent with the Supreme Court's rationale
for distinguishing physical from testimonial evidence.12 1 Further,
in requiring something in addition to the usual Miranda warn-
ings to protect the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege, Da-
vis is actually consistent with the Supreme Court's rationale for
-the Miranda requirements.122
A. The Testimonial Question
The evidence at issue in Davis, a pair of pants, is physical
118. 453 F. Supp. at 1326.
119. See notes 61-71 and accompanying text supra.
120. See notes 18-45 and accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 123-53 and accompanying text infra.
122. See notes 154-81 and accompanying text infra.
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evidence. Since a defendant may be constitutionally compelled
to provide physical evidence,s in order to find that Davis had a
claim to Fifth Amendment protection, it was necessary for the
court to determine that the production of clothing was some-
thing more.
Physical evidence is most frequently obtained through a
valid search, 124 and the state argued that the pants were physical
evidence properly seized in a. search incident to a lawful ar-
rest.128 Depending on the circumstances, if Davis had been wear-
ing the pants at the time of his arrest, or if the pants had been
within his arms' reach, the police might have seized them in ac-
cordance with this exception to the requirement of a search war-
rant."6 Under those circumstances, the police would have ob-
tained the clothing and nothing more. What made the pants a
critical piece of evidence in this case, however, was Davis's ad-
mission, through his conduct, that he had worn them on the
night of the murder. Without this information, which Davis pro-
vided by complying with the police order to put on the clothing
he had worn the previous evening, the evidentiary value of the
pants probably would have been less significant. 2 7 Thus, the
court rejected a search and seizure analysis, the analysis that
had been the basis for admitting the clothing in the state
courts.
12 8
The Davis court also found that the Schmerber12 9 rationale
was not controlling. Although the court did not analyze the facts
to draw the distinction between the Davis case and those in
which a defendant is compelled to exhibit his physical character-
istics, its conclusion is clearly correct. Davis was not merely the
source of physical evidence the relevance of which could be es-
tablished by independent witnesses.130 The state had produced
123. See notes 61-71 and accompanying text supra.
124. See notes 74-79 and accompanying text supra.
125. The state argued that Davis's arrest was lawful since it was supported by prob-
able cause. Brief for Respondent at 13, Davis v. Israel, 453 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis.
1978). See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
126. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
127. See note 14 supra and note 110 and accompanying text supra.
128. State v. Davis, 66 Wis. 2d 636, 225 N.W.2d 505 (1975).
129. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See notes 64-71 and accompany-
ing text supra.
130. See People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
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no witnesses who had seen Davis wearing the clothing at the
time of the crime.13 1 Davis's very act of producing the clothing
was a communication to the police, a communication by which
he himself established that he had been wearing them on the
previous evening, the evening when the murder had been
committed.
Since Davis presented issues of first impression, the author-
ity available to the court to support the testimonial aspect of
Davis's production of the clothing was limited. The Davis court
cited, but did not discuss, the decision of the Washington appel-
late court in State v. Dennis,'32 which also held a defendant's
production of physical evidence to be a testimonial response.
The defendant in Dennis had been in police custody at his home
when the police, in order to avoid the necessity of a search war-
rant, requested him to produce drugs which the officer believed
were in the apartment. 33 The Dennis court reasoned that the
defendant's subsequent acts of removing the cocaine from its
hiding place and putting it on the table in front of the police
were admissions which conveyed more graphically than words
that he knew of the presence and precise location of the contra-
band in his home.13 4 Consequently, the court in Dennis sup-
pressed the evidence because the officers had not advised the
defendant of his Miranda rights."' The Davis court might have
131. Davis v. Israel, 453 F. Supp. 1316, 1325-26 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
132. 16 Wash. App. 417, 558 P.2d 297 (1976).
133. According to the opinion, another officer had gone to get a proper search war-
rant. Id. at 418, 558 P.2d at 299.
134. Id. at 423, 558 P.2d at 301. The court noted that although the drugs might have
been obtained by a search warrant, or with the defendant's consent, the defendant's re-
sponse added the ingredient of guilty knowledge, all but negating any possible defense of
unknowing possession. Id. at 423-24, 558 P.2d at 301.
135. Subsequent to Davis, two other courts have found defendants' productions of
evidence at the request of the police to be testimonial, and, in both cases, the evidence
was suppressed because the defendants had not been given their Miranda warnings. In
State v. Moreno, 21 Wash. App. 430, 585 P.2d 481 (1978), the court, relying on the Den-
nis decision, held a defendant's production of cocaine during an airport interrogation to
be testimonial. The prosecution argued, inter alia, that if the court found that the defen-
dant was in custody at the time the police officer asked, "Do you have something you
shouldn't?" the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the cocaine, which would
have been discovered in a valid search incident to arrest, should be admissible. The
court, however, found that no probable cause supported the arrest. Id. at 436, 585 P.2d
at 485.
In State v. Mason, 164 N.J. Super. 1, 395 A.2d 536 (1979), the court suppressed, on
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omitted any discussion of the Dennis decision because the hold-
ing in Dennis was based on the defendant's failure to receive
Miranda warnings.
The Davis court focused on cases in which the crucial ele-
ment was the the defendant's identification of the evidence. In
Null v. Wainwright, 186 the defendant was arrested at his home
and told by the arresting officers that they would need the
clothes he had been wearing the night before. He replied, "Well,
these are the same clothes I had on yesterday."3 7 The court
suppressed Null's statement because he had not been given his
Miranda warnings. 8 8 The state argued that, even if the state-
ment should be suppressed, the tangible fruits of the statement,
the clothing, should be admissible. The Null court further as-
sumed, without deciding, that the fruits of statements taken in
violation of Miranda generally should be inadmissible.3 9 The
Davis court compared its facts with those in Null and correctly
recognized that no real difference existed between what Null
said and what Davis did. Davis's non-verbal response provided
the same kind of incriminating information that Null provided
by his oral statement; each identified the evidence by linking it
to the time of the crime.
In addition, the Davis court sought support in Supreme
Court cases dealing with the production of documents.14 0 The
Davis court, however, never rationalized its analogy to these
cases, but merely introduced them by stating that "the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that the protections of the
Fifth Amendment are not limited to oral communications but
also include privileges against performing acts which are merely
Fifth Amendment grounds, the contraband which the defendant had produced after be-
ing asked by a police officer if she had any drugs. The court construed her action as a
non-verbal response which should be treated in the game way as a verbal response. Since
the police did not arrest the defendant, but instead chose to interrogate her, the court
rejected the argument that a search incident to a lawful arrest had occurred. Id. at 4, 395
A.2d at 538.
136. 508 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 970 (1975).
137. Id. at 341.
138. Id. at 342.
139. Id. at 343. In the circumstances of the case, however, the error was found to be
harmless. Id. at 345.
140. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974). See notes 84-94 and accompany-
ing text supra.
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a substitute for words."' 4 ' The Davis court's reliance on these
cases is soundly based; the opinions stressed the importance, for
Fifth Amendment purposes, of whether the defendant was asked
to do or say anything to authenticate the materials produced. 1 2
An examination of the language which the Davis court
quoted from the document-production cases reveals that its em-
phasis was on the concept of authentication.1' The Supreme
Court indicated in these cases that the applicability of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination depended on whether the defen-
dant had been compelled to vouch for the authenticity of the
materials that the government had sought to have produced."
If an individual is compelled to state implicitly, by producing a
document, that the document is in fact the one demanded, the
Fifth Amendment privilege may apply."1 5 If, on the other hand,
141. Davis v. Israel, 453 F. Supp. 1316, 1324 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
142. See notes 136-37 and accompanying text supra.
143. The Davis court quoted the following passages:
As the Court explained in United States v. White, supra, 322 U.S. at 698, 64 S.Ct.
1248, "[t]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimination ... is designed to
prevent the use of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual the
evidence necessary to convict him or to force him to produce and authenticate any
personal documents or effects that might incriminate him." Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85, 88, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2183, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974).
We have recognized that the Fifth Amendment "respects a private inner
sanctum of individual feeling and thought"-an inner sanctum which necessarily
includes an individual's papers and effects to the extent that the privilege bars
their compulsory production and authentication-and "proscribes state intrusion
to extract self-condemnation." Id. at 91, 94 S.Ct. at 2184.
This case thus falls within the principle stated by Mr. Justice Holmes: "A
party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production."
Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458, 33 S.Ct. 572, 57 L.Ed. 919 (1913).
This principle recognizes that the protection afforded by the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment "adheres basically to the person, not to informa-
tion that may incriminate him." Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. [322] at 328, 93
S.Ct. 611, [34 L.Ed.2d 548]. Thus, although the Fifth Amendment may protect an
individual from complying with a subpoena for the production of his personal
records in his possession because the very act of production may constitute a com-
pulsory authentication of incriminating information, see Fisher v. United States,
supra, a seizure of the same materials by law enforcement officers differs in a cru-
cial respect-the individual against whom the search is directed is not required to
aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of incriminating evidence.
[Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 at 473-74 (1976)].
Davis v. Israel, 453 F. Supp. 1316, 1324-25 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
144. See notes 84-94 and accompanying text supra.
145. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 412 n. 12 (1976).
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the defendant is not compelled to produce the document, and if
its authenticity can be established by a third party, the privilege
is inapplicable. 4
6
The Davis court implied an analogy between Davis's act of
identification and acts of authentication of a document. Davis
was compelled to produce the clothing, and by producing them
he implicitly authenticated them as those worn on the previous
evening since implicit in his response was his assurance that the
clothing produced was the clothing demanded. His action an-
nounced: "This is what I was wearing last night." Even if the
clothing could have been obtained by another method, such as a
search incident to a lawful arrest,14 7 the state would have had to
establish, through an independent witness, that Davis had been
wearing it at the time of the murder. The prosecution presented
no such evidence at trial. The authentication of the clothing was
supplied by Davis, who provided this testimony when he pro-
duced the clothing. This act of identification should be pro-
tected, therefore, by the Fifth Amendment as testimonial
conduct.
Since the Davis court reached its decision before the United
States Supreme Court decided Rhode Island v. Innis, 8 the Da-
vis court did not apply the Innis test to determine whether an
interrogation had occurred. 4 9 As noted above, according to In-
nis, interrogation includes any words or actions on the part of
the police, other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody, that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. 50 The defen-
dant in Davis was not merely told to get dressed, which would
have been a normal request on the part of the police. Instead, he
was told to get dressed in the clothing he had worn on the previ-
ous night, the night of the murder. The only possible reason for
such an order was to obtain evidence linking Davis to the
crime.5 1 Indeed, the police order was the same as a police inter-
rogatory: "What clothing did you wear last night?" Under the
146. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
147. See notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
148. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980). See notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra.
149. The court did determine that Davis was in custody. See note 96 supra.
150. 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91.
151. See note 173 and accompanying text infra.
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Innis test, the police should have known that such an order was
likely to produce an incriminating response. It was, therefore, an
interrogation under Miranda.
In sum, the Davis court correctly found support for its hold-
ing in a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit involving a defendant's identification, by his oral
testimony, of incriminating evidence and in Supreme Court
cases involving production of documents. Davis's production of
the clothing may be analyzed as a nonverbal statement which
was made in response to police interrogation and which served
as an acknowledgment that he had worn the clothing on the
night of the murder. 15 Alternatively, the situation might be ana-
lyzed as a compulsion to authenticate the clothing by responding
to the order to produce it.153
B. Miranda Analysis
After finding that the production of the clothing was testi-
monial conduct, the Davis court addressed the issue of whether
the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination had been properly protected. This issue, how-
ever, did not fit easily into the established framework for analy-
sis of Miranda questions. Davis had not made an oral or written
statement, yet the court determined that his actions were within
the protection of the Fifth Amendment.""' Davis was also not
the typical case in which a defendant claims that the Miranda
warnings given were incorrect or incomplete; no contention was
made that the warnings Davis received had departed in any way
from those prescribed by Miranda. The question presented was
whether, as also required by Miranda, Davis had understood his
rights. The effect of the court's analysis of the Miranda question
was to invalidate a facially sufficient warning because it did not
adequately protect the defendant against self-incrimination.
This determination suggests that the court was examining
the substance of the warnings rather than their form. The court,
however, did not cite available case law ruling that, in assessing
the adequacy of the Miranda warnings, substance should take
152. See notes 140-42 and accompanying text supra.
153. See notes 73-94 and accompanying text supra.
154. See notes 95-113 and accompanying text supra.
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priority over form. 155 These cases could have been marshalled to
support the position that the defendant's subjective understand-
ing of the warnings he had been given was of primary impor-
tance, even though these decisions dealt with technical deficien-
cies in the warnings given, and the question they addressed was
whether the warnings, as given, were substantially the same as
those prescribed by Miranda. In Davis, on the other hand, the
form of the warnings was in full conformity with Miranda.
Nonetheless, the Davis court looked beyond the form of the
warnings to the substance of what Davis had been told-and
what he impliedly had not been told.
The court in Davis also did not discuss or rely on any test,
such as that set out in Coyote v. United States,5 6 for determin-
ing the adequacy of the warnings. Its holding that the warnings
given Davis were insufficient under the circumstances was based
on a practical assessment of the effectiveness of the words in
informing Davis of his rights.1 57 The court employed a common
sense analysis: a layman would not have known that the right to
remain silent included the right to refuse to produce his cloth-
ing. The court's reasoning that the average person would fail to
appreciate the testimonial implications of his actions is further
strengthened by the fact that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
failed to recognize Davis's Fifth Amendment claim as
meritorious. 58
The only authority cited by the Davis court in connection
with its Miranda analysis was the Supreme Court decision in
Maness v. Meyers.159 Davis used the language of Maness to sup-
port the position that sometimes the privilege cannot be com-
pletely understood by a layman. It quoted the language of Chief
Justice Burger in Maness:
The assertion of a testimonial privilege, as of many other rights,
often depends upon legal advice from someone who is trained and
155. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
156. 380 F.2d 305 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992 (1967). See notes 28-29 and
accompanying text supra.
157. Davis v. Israel, 453 F. Supp. 1316, 1326 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
158. The Wisconsin court reviewed Davis's suppression motion only on Fourth
Amendment grounds, noting that the defendant had raised other claims which were
without merit. State v. Davis, 66 Wis. 2d 636, 225 N.W.2d 505 (1975). See note 181 infra.
159. 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
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skilled in the subject matter, and who may offer a more objective
opinion. A layman may not be aware of the precise scope, the nu-
ances, and boundaries of his Fifth Amendment privilege. 60
Maness, however, did not address the issue of whether an attor-
ney might be required to explain the meaning of the privilege so
that an individual could effectively waive it, but merely dealt
with the right of an attorney to advise his client on the scope of
the privilege without being held in contempt.'
The use of Maness in the context of a Miranda question
confuses more than clarifies what Davis held. Maness does not
change the fact that under Miranda a person can waive his priv-
ilege without having consulted with an attorney.162 Miranda
only requires that a defendant be made aware of his right to
have counsel present,16 not that an attorney be made available
immediately to explain the defendant's rights. A defendant who
waives his rights and makes a statement is not protected from
the consequences of his decision, even though an attorney would
presumbly have advised him to say nothing.'" Thus, the fact
that Davis made a "statement" without consulting an attorney
would not by itself make his waiver involuntary.
When an accused waives his rights by choosing to make a
statement without the advice of counsel, however, he has at least
understood that he has the right to say nothing."1 5 The Davis
160. Id. at 466.
161. Id. at 468. The decision held that a lawyer may not be held in contempt for
advising his client, during the trial of a civil case, to refuse to produce material de-
manded by a subpoena duces tecum when the lawyer believes in good faith that the
material may tend to incriminate his client. Id.
162. See notes 31-45 and accompanying text supra. It has been suggested that the
Miranda opinion involves a basic ambiguity with respect to the question of waiver: Can a
suspect make a voluntary and knowledgeable choice whether to waive certain fundamen-
tal rights without the presence and advice of counsel in the first instance? See A.L.I.
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Draft No. 1 1968).
163. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
164. In United States v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the defendant
challenged the district court's refusal to suppress statements he had made concerning
the ownership of a sawed-off shotgun. He argued that, although he had acknowledged
that he understood his rights, his waiver was not knowing since he had not been told the
precise nature of the charge on which he had been arrested. Id. at 1212 n. 3. The circuit
court stated that even though the defendant's decision was based on less information
than a qualified attorney might have demanded before he offered a legal opinion, the
waiver was still knowing and voluntary. Id.
165. In United States v. Hall, 396 F.2d 841 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918
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court recognized that Davis did not have such an understanding
with respect to the act he was ordered to perform; he did not
recognize that his right to remain silent included the right not to
comply with the police order to put on the pants.6 6 Thus, it was
not Davis's failure to consult with an attorney that made his
waiver unknowing; it was the failure of the words of the warning
themselves to convey that more than speech was protected by
the Fifth Amendment privilege. 167 Because Davis did not know
what his rights were, he could not knowingly and intelligently
waive them.
IV. Impact
The Davis decision was based on the premise, stated in Mi-
randa, that before the prosecution can introduce into evidence
statements obtained from a defendant during a custodial inter-
rogation, it must demonstrate that the requirements of adequate
warnings and effective waiver have been met.168 The Davis court
reasoned that Davis, in effect, did not receive a warning, since
the warning given did not specifically encompass the kind of
statement he was told to make. Since he did not receive an ap-
propriate warning, he was unable to make an effective waiver.16 9
At first glance, Davis appears to be an unwarranted exten-
sion of Miranda at a time when the Supreme Court decisions
have constricted, or at least constrained, the decision.17 0 The
Burger Court's emphasis on the deterrent purpose of the Mi-
randa warnings presupposes that the police have engaged in un-
lawful conduct. When the police act in good faith, no need exists
(1968), the court rejected the defendant's claim that his ignorance of the high degree of
punishment allowable for the crime charged prevented a "knowing and intelligent
waiver." The court stated:
[T]he test is not whether [the defendant] made an intelligent decision in the sense
that it was wise or smart to admit his participation in the crime, but whether his
decision was made with the full understanding that he need say nothing at all and
that he might then consult with a lawyer if he so desired.
Id. at 846.
166. Davis v. Israel, 453 F. Supp. 1316, 1326 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
167. Id. at 1326.
168. See notes 15-47 and accompanying text supra.
169. Davis v. Israel, 453 F. Supp. 1316, 1326 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
170. See notes 46-59 and accompanying text supra.
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to deter future misconduct.17 1
In Davis, the police appear to have complied fully with Mi-
randa; they gave Davis his warnings exactly as Miranda re-
quires. The Davis decision, then, seems to put a burden on po-
lice officers to be aware of those subtleties of the Fifth
Amendment protection which Davis holds to be beyond a lay-
man's grasp. 172
While the police did not question Davis after giving him the
Miranda warnings, it is clear from that portion of the transcript
quoted in the Davis opinion that the police continued to seek
incriminating evidence from him. 73 The factors which, accord-
ing to Innis, constitute an interrogation were present in Davis.7 4
The police did not simply ask for Davis's clothing; they told him
to indicate the clothing that he had worn on the night of the
murder so that the clothing could be examined and Davis could
171. See notes 53-59 and accompanying text supra.
172. See notes 112-18 and accompanying text supra.
173. "Q Now, prior to telling him that, why did you want him to put on the
clothes he had on the night before?
"A Because he was a suspect.
"Q Well, in other words he was suspected of the crime?
"A Yes.
"Q And you wanted him to put on the clothes he had on at the time the crime was
committed?
"A Right.
"Q That was in the hopes of possibly solving the crime?
"A Possibly, sure.
"Q Possibly to find any stains or fibers or hairs that might assist? It's possible, is
that correct?
"A Well, I don't remember, Sir.
"Q Well, that is why you would want him to put on the clothes from the night
before?
"A Well, probably for identification.
"Q Identification and any other incriminating evidence that might be found on the
pants or jacket?
"A Sure.
"Q Now, prior to telling him to put on the clothing that he was wearing at the time
of the crime did anybody bother to tell him that that might be tending to in-
criminate himself?
"A No, Sir.
"Q Did anybody bother to tell him that he did not have to give evidence against
himself, that he did not have to bring spotted or bloody pants, either?
"A He was not advised of anything except his constitutional rights."
Davis v. Israel, 453 F. Supp. at 1318-19. See notes 6-10 and accompanying text supra.
174. See notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra.
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/6
DAVIS V. ISRAEL
be linked to the crime. If the officers were unaware of the testi-
monial implications of any responses to their order, the order
was made in good faith. If, on the other hand, they were sophis-
ticated enough to appreciate that they were asking Davis to
make a self-incriminating statement, their failure to inform Da-
vis that he need not comply would indicate bad faith. If good
faith were found, the Burger Court might see this decision as an
unwarranted extension of Miranda. On the other hand, if it were
found that the police acted in bad faith, the deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule, which the Burger Court decisions empha-
size, is served by the Davis decision.
The good faith or bad faith of the police, however, should
not be determinative of the constitutional question. The Fifth
Amendment forbids the prosecution from compelling an individ-
ual to incriminate himself. In the view of the Miranda Court,
the custodial setting itself provides the compulsion to speak.17
Thus, unless Miranda is overruled, the police cannot seek self-
incriminating evidence from a defendant in custody without tell-
ing him that he has a right not to answer. In Davis, the police
elicited incriminating evidence from the defendant which, the
court determined, he was constitutionally entitled to withhold.
Although the Miranda requirement may not have been inten-
tionally circumvented, Davis was nevertheless compelled to give
self-incriminating evidence without being told that he had the
right not to comply with the police order.
The Davis decision does not suggest the need for an addi-
tion to the warnings already prescribed by Miranda. In fact, it
would be inaccurate to warn a defendant in custody that, in ad-
dition to the right to remain silent, he has the right to refuse to
do anything. Often the cooperation of an accused can be ob-
tained without violating constitutional rights.'7 6 A defendant
who has been arrested is required to submit to a search of his
175. In Miranda, the Court saw as inherently coercive any police custodial inter-
rogation conducted by isolating the suspect with police officers; therefore, the
Court established a per se rule that all incriminating statements made during
such interrogation are barred as "compelled." All Miranda's safeguards, which are
designed to avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion
which the Court thought was caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody.
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 n. 5 (1977).
176. See generally 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2265 (McNaughton rev. 1961 .
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person and of the area within his immediate control.1 77 He may
also be required to try on items of clothing,178 appear in a line-
up for visual identification,"'9 or submit to various physical
tests.180
What the decision does indicate, however, is that Miranda
did not foresee every possible situation. A defendant may, as in
Davis, make a self-incriminating statement through conduct
rather than through words.181 In such a case, the privilege
against self-incrimination is broader than the words of the Mi-
randa warnings indicate, and the standard Miranda warnings,
which are addressed to oral statements, cannot serve the pur-
pose of truly informing the accused of his rights. The only realis-
tic approach to this type of case is an ad hoc determination of
whether, under the circumstances, the defendant was adequately
notified of his rights under the Fifth Amendment.
V. Conclusion
In the circumstances presented in Davis, the police required
and received not only the bloodstained pants, but also the de-
fendant's indispensable identification of them as the clothing
worn on the night of the murder. Davis was in the very situation
to which the Miranda Court had responded. He was in the cus-
tody of the police whose guns were drawn. He was told to reveal
what he had worn the previous evening. Such an order was an
interrogation since the police should have known that it was rea-
177. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
178. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
179. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
180. E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood test).
L 181. It is not clear whether the dearth of cases dealing with a self-incrimination
based on facts such as those in Davis is the result of the rarity of such factual situations
or of a general failure to appreciate the Fifth Amendment issue in those circumstances.
In State v. Ege, 274 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1979), the court was presented with facts remark-
ably similar to those in Davis. The defendant, who was later convicted of rape, was ar-
rested by the police and given his Miranda warnings. He then, at the request of the
police, went into his house and obtained the clothing he was wearing the previous night,
the night of the rape. The defendant moved unsuccessfully to suppress the clothing on
Fourth Amendment grounds, but apparently did not raise a Fifth Amendment claim. On
appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court, which described the legal principles involved as rela-
tively simple, found a valid consent search. Id. at 353. The opinion did not indicate
whether the police had an independent description of the clothing prior to requesting its
production by the defendant.
[Vol. 1:183
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/6
19801 DAVIS V. ISRAEL 213
sonably likely to produce an incriminating response. By inter-
posing a warning that he had a right to remain silent, Miranda
attempted to protect the defendant's privilege not to incriminate
himself. In Davis, the police gave this Miranda warning. Under
these circumstances, however, the warning could not accomplish
its purpose: telling Davis that he had the right to remain silent
did not impart clear, understandable information that the order
to produce the clothing could be ignored. As a result, Davis gave
his "statement" without the requisite awareness of his Fifth
Amendment privilege. Accordingly, admission at trial of the evi-
dence acquired by the police was correctly held to violate the
Fifth Amendment.
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